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Abstract 
 
To study concepts, cognitive scientists must first identify some. 
The prevailing assumption is that they are revealed by words such 
as triangle, table, and robin. But languages vary dramatically in 
how they carve up the world by name. Either ordinary concepts 
must be heavily language-dependent or names cannot be a direct 
route to concepts. We asked English, Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese 
speakers to name videos of human locomotion and judge their 
similarities. We investigated what name inventories and scaling 
solutions on name similarity and on physical similarity for the 
groups individually and together suggest about the underlying 
concepts. Aggregated naming and similarity solutions converged 
on results distinct from the answers suggested by any single 
language. Words such as triangle, table, and robin help identify 
the conceptual space of a domain, but they do not directly reveal 
units of knowledge usefully considered “concepts.” 
 
Keywords: concepts; naming; cross-linguistic diversity; 
universality; locomotion 
Introduction 
Concepts have been said to give human experience stability 
(Smith & Medin, 1981), to hold our mental world together 
(Murphy, 2002), and to provide the foundation of human 
learning (Bloom, 2004). Fodor (1998) considered concepts 
so fundamental to cognition that he declared that the heart 
of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts.  If concepts 
are so important, then cognitive scientists need to be able to 
identify concepts to study. We ask here how concepts are to 
be found, and in particular what role words can play in 
identifying them.  
The prevailing assumption has been that many important 
concepts can be easily identified because they are revealed 
by words – in fact, for many researchers, the words of 
English. English nouns such as hat, fish, triangle, table, and 
robin are used to identify concepts in work encompassing 
not only the adult concepts literature but developmental 
work (e.g., Carey, 2009), computational models (e.g., 
Rogers & McClelland, 2004),  conceptual combination (e.g., 
Hampton, 1997), and neuroscience (.e.g., Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2007).  
But from a cross-linguistic perspective, this approach is 
startling.  There are many possible ways to map between 
words and the world, and languages vary dramatically in 
how they carve up the world by name. Substantial cross-
linguistic variation has been documented in domains 
including color, causality, mental states, number, body 
parts, containers, motion, direction, spatial relations, and 
terms for acts of cutting and breaking and of carrying and 
holding (see chapters in Malt & Wolff, 2010, for 
illustrations).This variation occurs even in concrete domains 
labeled by nouns, where structure in the world might seem 
most likely to provide universally recognized groupings 
captured by words.  Hand vs. arm, bottle vs. jar, or dish vs. 
plate may seem to English-speakers to be self-evident 
distinctions based on obvious discontinuities in the 
distribution of properties in the world, but not all languages 
observe these same distinctions (e.g., Malt et al., 1999; 
Majid, Enfield, & Van Staden, 2006).  
 In light of the documented diversity, there are three 
possibilities for the relationship between words and 
concepts. The first is that the words of a language do 
effectively reveal much of the stock of general-purpose 
concepts that a person holds. Given cross-linguistic 
variability in naming patterns, this possibility implies that 
word-learning creates much of the language user’s non-
linguistic representations of the world. Under this scenario, 
it is not possible to hold that any substantial stock of basic 
concepts is shared across speakers of different languages, 
since the language-specific sets will be substantially 
different from one another.   
 The second possibility is that concepts are dissociated to 
some notable extent from the large differences in naming 
patterns, and it is therefore impossible to use words to 
identify concepts.  After all, much learning about the world 
519
comes from direct interaction, rather than through language. 
Non-linguistic representations may be substantially shared 
(while still allowing that language could have some 
influence on them). Crucially, if linguistic and non-
linguistic representations are distinct and only loosely 
linked, then the words of a language cannot routinely and 
straightforwardly be used to identify a person’s concepts.  
The third possibility is that the relation of words to 
concepts is not as straightforward as current practice 
assumes (also suggested by the second possibility), but still, 
if examined in the right way, words may reveal something 
useful about conceptual representations shared across 
speakers of different languages.  By applying more 
sophisticated techniques to extract structure from language 
data, it may be possible to discern shared elements of 
meaning that indicate constraints on cross-language 
variability and reflect common underlying aspects of how 
knowledge is represented.    
Here, we assess the relation of words - specifically, verbs 
for human locomotion - to conceptual representations.  The 
data discriminate among the three possibilities just 
described and address what an appropriate use of words is 
for researchers whose interest is in underlying non-linguistic 
representations rather than in knowledge about the word 
meanings of a particular language. 
The Studies 
Speakers of four languages named instances of human 
locomotion such as walking, running, shuffling, and 
jumping, and made similarity judgments about them. 
Human locomotion provides a useful case study because 
there are reasons to expect both commonalities and 
differences in how speakers of different languages 
understand and name the domain. Using film clips of 
biomechanically defined instances of walking and running, 
we (Malt et al., 2008) found that English, Dutch, Spanish, 
and Japanese speakers all sorted the walking and running 
clips into separate piles on the basis of similarity and also 
drew a lexical distinction between them. We also found that 
speakers of English and Dutch named more distinctions 
within the two biomechanical gaits than speakers of Spanish 
and Japanese. Together, these considerations mean that it is 
useful to ask whether there is some shared understanding of 
more varied instances of locomotion, and whether there is 
any analysis of the potentially diverse naming patterns 
across languages that can reveal this shared understanding. 
The current studies again used speakers of English, Dutch, 
Spanish, and Japanese.  Although the first three all belong to 
the Indo-European family, their histories are different 
enough that the languages have shown substantial variation 
in naming patterns in other domains (e.g., containers: Malt 
et al., 1999) as well as in naming of locomotion for the more 
restricted set of exemplars in Malt et al. (2008).  
Study 1: Using Names to Look for Concepts 
We presented video clips of varied human locomotion and 
asked native speakers of English, Dutch, Spanish, and 
Japanese to name the motion in each. We first determined 
the name inventories for the four languages to see what they 
suggest as the basic concepts for human locomotion. We 
then performed scaling analyses on the naming data of 
individual groups to look further for common patterns 
underlying the names produced. Last, we combined the 
naming data of the four groups to see if greater coherence 
arises from the aggregated information. 
Method 
Thirty English speakers were recruited at Lehigh University, 
U.S.; 22 Spanish speakers at Comahue National University, 
Argentina; 26 Dutch speakers at the University of Leuven, 
Belgium; and 25 Japanese speakers at Keio University, 
Japan.  To generate the stimulus videos, we selected all the 
verbs that named gaits of an individual moving forward, 
upright, on a trajectory from a list of over 250 English verbs 
of manner of movement provided by D. Slobin. We added 
familiar gaits done in place (e.g., walking and running in 
place), walking in high heels, and eight variants of 
locomotion suggested by Japanese and Argentinean 
informants that were not covered by the English terms.  An 
American college student was filmed portraying each gait 
for 3-4 seconds on outdoor walkway at Lehigh University. 
The stimulus set was then reduced by selecting the 
movements that most clearly contrasted with each other. For 
instance, if the clips filmed in response to amble and 
saunter, or strut and swagger, looked very similar to us, we 
kept only one of each. The final set contained 36 clips. 
Figure 1 shows sample frames from four clips. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Sample frames from clips. 
 
 The clips were embedded in a web page.  Participants 
read instructions in the relevant language telling them that 
they would see a series of video clips, and that they should 
watch each one carefully and type into the response box the 
word or phrase that best described what they saw in the clip.  
Following the instructions were the 36 clips, each with a 
response box preceded by the words, “What is the woman 
doing?  She is….”  or their translation.  
Results and Discussion 
Name Inventories We determined the name inventories for 
each language to see what concepts are implied if names are 
taken to directly identify concepts, as is the common 
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practice in the literature. We counted as an instance of a 
name all surface forms containing the same root word(s) 
labeling a manner of movement and then determined the 
dominant (most commonly produced) name for each clip in 
each language. All names dominant for at least one clip in a 
language are given in Table 1. This tally makes clear that if 
there are universally shared locomotion concepts, the name 
inventories do not directly reveal what they are. The 
different languages provide different answers about what 
that set would be.   
 
Table 1: Inventory of mono- and multi-morpheme names   
 
Language 
English Dutch Spanish Japanese 
creep hinkelen caminar aruku 
gallop huppelen correr hashiru 
hop joggen marchar sukippu-suru 
jog lopen saltar ashibumi-suru 
jump marcheren trotar kenken-suru 
leap rennen  koushin-suru 
march slenteren  janpu-suru 
run sluipen   
skip springen   
stomp stappen   
walk wandelen     
shuffle    
tiptoe    
power walk    
Note.   Boldface indicates multi-morphemic terms.  
 
Individual Languages’ Naming as Similarity Data We 
next asked whether commonalities emerge from the naming 
data of the four languages if we make use of the full set of 
names produced by all participants. We created name 
similarity matrices that reflect the extent to which each pair 
of objects received the same name across speakers of a 
language. We assigned, for each participant, a 0 or a 1 to 
each possible pair of clips according to whether the person 
gave the two clips a different name or the same name. We 
constructed the similarity matrix for each language group by 
summing the distance values for each of the 630 possible 
pairs across the participants in that language group. This use 
of the data is similar to using confusion matrices as 
similarity data (e.g., Shepard & Chang, 1963).   
We first correlated the name similarity matrices for each 
pair of languages to give an overall sense of the 
correspondence in the naming patterns, using the Mantel test 
for correlation of matrices.  Table 2 shows that these 
correlations are all substantial and significant. The full 
patterns of name use, while diverse, still share some 
substantial commonalities.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Between-group correlations of naming matrices  
 
 English Dutch Spanish 
English    
Dutch 0.82   
Spanish 0.69 0.65  
Japanese 0.76 0.76 0.79 
Note. All correlations are significant at p < .0009. 
 
We then carried out multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) on 
the matrix for each language with Additive Tree clusters 
drawn on the solutions to help interpret the results (Sattath 
& Tversky, 1977).  Due to space constraints we do not 
present the solutions here but note that they showed both 
similarities and distinct differences.  For all four languages, 
the X-axis was interpretable in terms of the basic 
biomechanical distinction between elastic, bounce-and-
recoil gaits (running, hopping, jumping, etc.) and the 
pendulum gaits where one foot is on the ground at all times 
(walking, striding, etc.). The Y-axis for the most part 
seemed to reflect a dimension of speed and/or 
aggressiveness, but the Japanese solution less clearly 
conformed to this possibility. The Addtree clusters 
reinforced the idea that the biomechanical distinction is 
salient for two of the languages – Dutch and Japanese – 
which had similar top-level clusters separating essentially 
the same clips. English and Spanish clusters were less like 
the Dutch and Japanese results: for English, running actions 
clustered with pendulum motions at the top level, and for 
Spanish, walking backwards and several forms of marching 
combined with bounce-and-recoil motions, as well as 
walking in place. In the next level of clusters within these 
top-level clusters, each language more or less separated the 
faster/more aggressive pendulum actions from slower, more 
cautious pendulum actions, but the exact composition of the 
clusters was variable.  The Dutch solution, in particular, did 
not honor this separation as much as the others.   
These solutions indicate that the naming patterns of the 
four languages reflect a shared orientation to the same 
dimensions of the movements. This outcome supports the 
idea that speakers of the four languages may have more in 
common in their perception of the domain than their name 
inventories indicate. In light of the variability of the Addtree 
clusters across the four solutions, though, it remains difficult 
to specify exactly what could be identified as shared discrete 
concepts in the traditional sense.  
 
Aggregated Naming as Similarity Data Last, we created 
an MDS solution combining the naming data of all four 
language groups.  MDS looks for commonalities in the data, 
and to the extent that it finds them, produces a coherent 
solution. If a coherent solution emerges, this result would 
support the idea of a shared conceptualization of the domain 
while underscoring the inadequacy of individual words of a 
single language to reveal it. 
We carried out the MDS using a stacked name similarity 
matrix consisting of 36 columns (the clips) and 4 x 36 
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(language x clips) rows. Stacking allows the program to 
compute different weights for each language for the 
dimensions extracted. Figure 2 shows the two-dimensional 
solution, with clusters provided by Addtree. This solution 
shows a neat horizontal separation of the bounce-and-recoil 
motions (toward the right) from the pendulum motions 
(toward the left). The vertical dimension appears to reflect 
speed and aggressiveness of the actions, with slower/less 
aggressive actions toward the top and faster/more aggressive 
ones toward the bottom.  
 
 
Figure 2.  MDS solution based on the four languages’ 
stacked naming data. Clip names refer to names bestowed 
by the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
 
At the top level of clustering, the bounce-and-recoil 
motions are separated from the pendulum-based ones, with 
the exception of the TROT clip falling into the pendulum 
cluster. Within these clusters, sub-clusters separate the 
running clips from the other bounce-and-recoil actions, and 
separate the true pendulum motion clips from the 
intermediate TROT clip. These clusters are thus readily 
interpretable, although they do not seem to map directly 
onto the words of any of the languages.   
Thus, the naming data when aggregated across the four 
languages provides more indication of a systematic 
conceptual space than looking at scaling solutions of the 
four languages individually.  This shared space emerges out 
of the noisiness of the individual name inventories, which 
make different distinctions and numbers of distinctions. 
Because MDS can discover commonalities in data but it 
cannot invent them, the simplicity of the solution is 
evidence in favor of a shared underlying understanding of 
the domain. At the same time, though, if the clusters 
identified by Addtree are taken to indicate discrete concepts 
within this space, they do not seem to be picked out by 
words of the languages.  
 
Conclusions from Using Names to Look for Concepts 
These analyses demonstrate that languages differ in what 
their name inventories would tell us the concepts for the 
domain are. If there are shared basic concepts, then the 
words of any one language do not directly reveal what they 
are. Despite the diversity evident in the name inventories, 
other ways of analyzing the data provide more evidence of 
commonalities underlying the naming patterns. In particular, 
scaling of the combined naming data of four languages 
produces a coherent and interpretable solution, suggesting a 
shared orientation to certain dimensions of the space. Still, 
the clusters within the scaling solution indicated by Addtree 
do not neatly correspond to those labeled by the names of 
the languages, raising questions about what, if anything, can 
be identified as discrete concepts in the traditional sense.   
Study 2: Using Judgments of Physical 
Similarity to Look for Concepts 
We collected judgments of the physical similarity of the 
actions in the video clips. We can evaluate to what extent 
those perceived similarities are shared across speakers of 
different languages, and to what extent they are related to 
the naming patterns of the participant’s languages. Although 
physical attributes most likely do not exhaust conceptual 
knowledge in this domain, they are a large component of it.  
Method 
Twenty English speakers were recruited at Lehigh 
University, U.S.; 20 Dutch speakers at the University of 
Leuven, Belgium; 15 Spanish speakers at the Bariloche 
Atomic Centre and Balseiro Institute, Argentina; and 24 
Japanese speakers at Keio University, Japan. Stimuli were 
the same 36 video clips of human locomotion used in Study 
1. A computer program presented the clips in a 6 x 6 array 
on a computer screen, with each clip running in a 
continuous loop. Participants sorted the clips according to 
the physical similarity of the actions by dragging and 
dropping clips (still running) into boxes on the right side of 
the screen, creating as many boxes as they wished. 
Following Boster (1994), to reduce variability in the number 
of piles created, if they had created five or fewer boxes in 
the first sort, they were then asked to divide the boxes 
further. If they had created more than five, they were asked 
to combine boxes.  
Results and Discussion 
For each participant, a distance of zero reflects the case 
where two clips are not in the same pile in either sort; a 
distance of one reflects the case where they are in the same 
pile in one sort but apart in the other, and two reflects the 
case where they are in the same pile in both (Boster, 1994).  
We constructed a similarity matrix for each language group 
by summing the distance values for each of the 630 possible 
pairs of clips across its members. Table 3 shows that the 
similarity judgments of the four groups are strongly 
correlated. The correlations among the sorting matrices are 
significantly higher than those for naming were with the 
exception of Dutch to Japanese, ps < .0001. Speakers of the 
four languages are more alike in how they sort the gaits 
based on similarity than in how they name them.  
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Table 3: Between-group correlations of sorting matrices 
 
 English Dutch Spanish 
English    
Dutch 0.87   
Spanish 0.84 0.83  
Japanese 0.89 0.75 0.89 
Note. All correlations are significant at p < .0009. 
 
An aggregated MDS solution was constructed as for the 
aggregated name similarity by stacking the matrices of the 
four groups. The two-dimensional solution is shown in 
Figure 3, overlaid with an Additive tree cluster analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. MDS solution based on four language groups’ 
stacked sorting data. Clip names refer to names bestowed by 
the experimenters, not names produced by participants.  
 
As for naming, the horizontal dimension of the MDS 
solution is readily interpreted in terms of the biomechanical 
gait distinction described earlier. Toward the left are gaits 
with the pendulum motion.  To the right are the ones with 
the elastic bounce-and-recoil motion. Toward the middle are 
some stimuli having knees lifted high but lacking real 
bouncing off the ground (sneaking, walking in place, 
various forms of marching, etc.).  Also as for naming, the 
vertical dimension seems to reflect something about the 
speed/aggressiveness of the actions, although on the left it 
seems to be that faster, more aggressive motions are at the 
top and on the right this pattern reverses. Allowing MDS to 
use three dimensions (not pictured here) this reversal 
between left and right goes away, with the extra dimension 
allowing a speed dimension to separate itself from an 
aggressiveness dimension. Consistent with the importance 
of the biomechanical distinction and speed/aggressivness 
dimensions, the two top-level clusters that Addtree 
identifies largely separate the gaits with the bounce-and-
recoil motion from those with a pendulum motion. Within 
the left-hand large cluster, the sub-clusters may be 
characterized as distinguishing groups of pendulum motions 
that are more slow and cautious (lower cluster) from those 
that are more fast and aggressive (top cluster). On the right, 
one sub-cluster encompasses all the bounce-and-recoil 
actions that involve forward (or sideways) motion.  The 
other encompasses those that involve bounce-and-recoil 
movements in place (hopping, jumping, and running in 
place), plus marching in place and walking in place.  
The sorting solution points to largely the same sets of 
dimensions as the combined naming data did, despite the 
somewhat different spatial layout and clustering.  There was 
one notable exception to the close correspondence with the 
naming solution. In the sorting data, the five clips that entail 
motion in place (hopping, jumping, running, marching, and 
walking in place) do form a sub-cluster, but in the naming 
they did not. It seems that being carried out in place is a 
salient physical property of the actions, even though none of 
the four languages honors it with a basic level name that sets 
the actions apart on that basis.  
 
Conclusions from Using Physical Similarity Judgments 
to Look for Concepts Speakers of our four languages make 
closely corresponding judgments of the similarity among 
the 36 actions. Furthermore, there is higher correspondence 
among language groups on this sorting task than on naming, 
consistent with other domains (e.g., Malt et al., 1999). The 
data indicate that the understanding of locomotion is more 
shared, and more tied to the perceptual and biomechanical 
experience of the domain, than the varied word inventories 
would imply. Again, the data argue against assuming a close 
alignment of words with concepts. 
Although the sorting data clearly indicate the inadequacy 
of the inventories of individual names to reveal shared 
understanding of the locomotion domain, the scaling 
solutions do show a marked resemblance to the combined 
naming data.  This outcome suggests that both reflect some 
deeper commonality in the dimensions of locomotion space 
that people find salient. At the same time, and despite some 
proposals in the literature that concepts fall directly out of 
similarity space (e.g., Rogers & McCelland, 2004), the 
scaling solution still does not directly reveal concepts in the 
sense of bounded units of knowledge stored in long-term 
memory. Would they be the top-level distinctions in the 
cluster solution that seem to be grounded in the 
biomechanical contrast between pendulum and bounce-and-
recoil motions? Would they be at the level of the next set of 
clusters, which corresponds better, but far from perfectly, to 
the words of the languages? Or might they be at some other 
level? And what about the discrepancies that do exist 
between the sorting and naming solutions? In other words, 
how can we identify exactly what the basic concepts are that 
should be the subject of investigation by those researchers 
who want to study them?  We consider these points below.   
General Discussion 
The data indicate that the relation of words to concepts is 
not straightforward.  Pervasive linguistic diversity, amply 
documented in other research but rarely taken into 
consideration within “concepts” research, is by itself cause 
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for serious concern.  It would still be possible to preserve a 
commitment to word-concept alignment by subscribing to a 
strong version of the idea that language shapes thought. 
However, the evidence here from aggregated naming and 
from sorting suggests that any conceptual differences 
between speakers of different languages are less than 
implied by the large differences in word inventories. This 
outcome is consistent with findings in other domains and 
with the observation that attention to aspects of the world is 
likely shaped by multiple forces that include but are not 
limited to language.  It seems unavoidable to conclude that 
researchers need to stop relying on the word inventories of 
English, or any other single language, to know what 
constitutes the concepts of a domain.   
Despite the complex nature of the relationship between 
language and concepts, our data suggest that it is still 
possible to use linguistic data to gain insight into something 
more fundamental about the nature of conceptual space. 
Combining naming information across languages does seem 
to provide useful information, because the aggregate allows 
the commonalities to emerge over the “noise” of individual 
language idiosyncracies. However, for researchers whose 
usual methodologies entail only members of one language 
group, obtaining such cross-linguistic data may not be 
feasible. Developing other methods of avoiding reliance on 
a faulty word-concept equivalence will be crucial. 
The scaling solutions still leave it unclear exactly what 
units of knowledge should count as the most fundamental, 
basic concepts of the domain. Different data sets (sorting vs. 
naming) and different levels of the cluster analysis produce 
somewhat different potential answers. The difficulty of 
specifying exactly what constitute the basic concepts 
suggests that it may be time for psychologists to more 
radically rethink conceptual understanding of a domain. An 
alternative approach to understanding where shared and 
possibly innate elements of mental representation are to be 
found is represented by the search for smaller units of 
knowledge such as EVENT, STATE, THING, PATH, 
PLACE, GOAL, MEANS, and END, etc. (see, e.g.,  Pinker, 
2007). In this type of approach, the goal is not to identify 
discrete, bounded, and stable units of knowledge stored in 
long-term memory. Instead, what is identified are the 
dimensions of experience to which people attend under 
various circumstances. Such an approach may prove more 
fruitful than looking for traditional concepts. 
 
Conclusion   If the heart of a cognitive science is its theory 
of concepts, then cognitive scientists need to re-think how to 
find the concepts.  Words can help identify the conceptual 
space of a domain, but they do not directly reveal bounded 
units of knowledge that can be labeled “concepts.” 
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